Affirming Brahimi: East Timor Makes the Case for a Model Criminal Code by Fairlie, Megan A.
American University International Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 5 Article 1
2003
Affirming Brahimi: East Timor Makes the Case for
a Model Criminal Code
Megan A. Fairlie
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fairlie, Megan A. "Affirming Brahimi: East Timor Makes the Case for a Model Criminal Code." American University International Law
Review 18, no. 5 (2003): 1059-1102.
AFFIRMING BRAHIMI: EAST TIMOR MAKES
THE CASE FOR A MODEL CRIMINAL CODE
MEGAN A. FAIRLIE*
INTRODU CTION ............................................. 1060
I. BACKGROUND ........................................... 1061
II. UNTAET- RESOLUTION 1272 ............................ 1066
III. REGULATION 1999/1 ..................................... 1069
A. THE APPLICATION OF TRI-LAW .......................... 1073
B. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS .................................. 1076
C. THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL CODE AND CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE .................................. 1078
1. D omestic Violence .................................. 1080
2. R ap e ................................................ 10 83
3. Torture ................................ . . ........ 1085
4. Defamation and the Case of Takeshi Kashiwagi ..... 1087
5. Additional Areas of Concern ........................ 1095
IV. THE NEED FOR A MODEL CODE ........................ 1096
V. LESSONS LEARNED ..................................... 1098
A . OTHER M ISSIONS ........................................ 1098
B . E AST TIM OR ............................................ 1099
Admitted to practice law in New York and North Carolina; B.A., University at
Albany (N.Y.), Summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, J.D., Washington and Lee
University, Cum laude, LL.M. candidate, National University of Ireland, Galway.
The author would like to express her gratitude to Brian and Gail Fairlie for their
generous and unwaivering dedication to the principle that parenting requires a life-
long commitment. The author would also like to thank Dr. Ray Murphy, founder
and director of the LL.M. programme in International Peace Support Operations,
for his kindness and accessibility. This article is dedicated to the memory of
Kristin Leigh Hynes, human rights advocate, cherished friend and continual source
of inspiration.
1059
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
INTRODUCTION
In August of 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations ("Brahimi Report") addressed the issue of
transitional civil administration as an element of United Nations field
operations. I Despite acknowledging the fact that support for the same
was not universal amongst the U.N. member states, the panel pointed
out the possibility that circumstances such as intra-state conflicts and
instability may well necessitate its inclusion as an aspect in future
missions.' In light of this recognition, the Brahimi Report cites the
need for an interim legal code as part of a U.N. justice package to
address the issue of "applicable law" in the early stages of a U.N.
mission.3 This paper addresses the potential benefit of producing
such a set of laws by providing an overview of the experience of the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
("UNTAET") in the absence of access to a ready-made temporary
legal code.
1. See Identical Letters dated 21 August 2000from the Secretary General to
the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 87, paras. 76-83, U.N. Doe. A/55/305-
S/2000/809 (2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report] (stating that no other United
Nations field operations must conduct a myriad of responsibilities such as to set
and enforce the law, establish customs services and regulations, and collect taxes,
all while rebuilding civil society and promoting respect for human rights in a war
torn region), available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2003).
2. See id. para. 78.
3. See id. para. 81. The development of an interim legal code is presently a
component of the United States Institute of Peace Project on Peacekeeping and the
Administration of Justice. See Applicable Law in Complex Peacekeeping
Situations, at
http://www.nuigalway.ie/human-rights/applicable%201aw%20project.htm (last
visited May 3, 2003).
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I. BACKGROUND
East Timor comprises approximately one-half of an island that lies
East of the Indian Ocean, between Australia and Indonesia.' Portugal
colonized and held East Timor for more than four hundred years.'
Though recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as a
non-self-governing territory in 1960,6 one day after the General
Assembly adopted its Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples,7 Portugal continued to hold the
territory until 1974.8 Its rule in the latter half of the twentieth century
was repressive and the living conditions in East Timor were sub-
standard. 9
In the early 1970's, Portugal's economy was suffering ° and a
revolution brought down its governing military dictatorship.1"
4. See James Traub, Inventing East Timor, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 74 (2000)
(detailing East Timor's precise location and describing its terrain as thickly
forested), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/traub.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2003).
5. See IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR: THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE BALLOT, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 15 (2001) (stating
that Portugal considered East Timor its "overseas province"); see also Roger S.
Clark, East Timor, Indonesia and the International Community, 14 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 75, 77 (2000) (stating that Portugal began its presence in Timor as it
developed its trading routes).
6. East Timor would remain on this list until removed by General Assembly
Resolution in 2002. G.A. Res. 56/282, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 18,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/282 (2002).
7. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1961), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cldgiccp.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
8. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 15 (noting that in July 1974, Portugal adopted
a constitutional law that accepted the right of independence for its colonies).
9. See Jani Purnawanty, Various Perspectives in Understanding the East
Timor Crisis, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 61, 63 (2000).
10. See Clark, supra note 5, at 79 (positing that this made it difficult to finance
the administration of an overseas territory).
11. See Colin McDonald, Out of the Ashes-A New Criminal Justice System for
East Timor, 6 (Aug. 30, 2001) (paper presented to the International Society for the
Reform of the Criminal Law, 15th International Conference, Politics, Crime and
Criminal Justice, Aug. 26-30, 2001, Canberra, Australia) (recounting that at the
time of the April 1974 revolution, the Portuguese economy was in decline and hard
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Political parties began to develop within East Timor, with the most
noticeable divide between those factions that championed
independence and those that preferred integration with Indonesia,12
which controlled the western half of the island.' 3 The Portuguese
revolution created a void in governance in East Timor that was
seized upon; civil war ensued until East Timor declared
independence on November 28, 1975.14 Indonesian military forces
invaded shortly thereafter and claimed East Timor as Indonesia's
twenty-seventh province in July 1976.15 The rule that followed was
oppressive, corrupt, and predatory.' 6
In the ensuing years, Australia was the only state to officially
recognize the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, 17 but there were
no real international challenges to Indonesian control. 8 While the
United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions "deploring
the intervention" and calling upon "all States to respect the territorial
pressed to deal with the effects of the revolution), available at
http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/McDONALD.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
12. See id. (noting that there were three major political groups at the time: the
Uniano Democratic Timorese that favored eventual independence, the Frentilin
that favored greater participation of East Timorese in government and
independence, and the Adopeti group that preferred integration with Indonesia);
see also Clark, supra note 5, at 79 (arguing that the majority of East Timorese
favored independence).
13. See Traub, supra note 4 (describing how Holland transferred the western
half of the island, also a former colony, to Indonesia in 1949).
14. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that this declaration was
officially rejected by Portugal).
15. See id. (stating that the United Nations never formally recognized this act
of annexation).
16. See Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N.
State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1102 (2001)
(recognizing Indonesia's twenty-four years of brutal occupation of East Timor).
17. See Jarat Chopra, The UN's Kingdom of East Timor, 42 SURVIVAL 27, 29
(2000); see also Suzannah Linton, Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable
System of Justice in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 122, 127 (2001) (positing
that Australia recognized Indonesian control in order to contract with the state for
the extraction of oil from the continental shelf around East Timor), available at
http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdfl/linton.pdf (last visited May 4, 2003); Traub,
supra note 4 (noting that although no country except Australia had ever recognized
the legitimacy of this annexation, the UN Security Council had always treated this
as an internal Indonesian problem).
18. See McDonald, supra note I1, at 7.
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integrity of East Timor,"' 9 little else was done except the passage of
like resolutions by the General Assembly.20  The apparent
indifference of the international community has been attributed to the
Cold War theory of the "domino effect" and Indonesia's resultant
vital role as a non-communist state in Southeast Asia.z'
Throughout the period of Indonesian occupation, those East
Timorese who were members of the pro-independence armed forces,
Falintil, practiced guerrilla warfare.22 Despite Indonesian efforts to
suppress the independence movement, Indonesia never completely
accomplished this objective 3 and in the late 1990's, Indonesia began
to experience its own difficulties.24 Indonesia incurred a financial
crisis in 19985 and, like the Portuguese experience twenty years
earlier, the economic situation resulted in a change in leadership and
discussion about the liberation of East Timor.26
On January 27, 1999, Indonesia announced that the new
administration would allow for a referendum in which the people of
19. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/384
(1975); S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1914th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/389
(1976).
20. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that Resolution 37/30 gave a
mandate to the Secretary-General to begin a diplomatic effort to find a solution to
the East Timor problem; however, the item was deferred each year).
21. See Ramesh Thakur, Cambodia, East Timor and the Brahimi Report, 8
INT'L PEACEKEEPING 115, 117 (2001) (noting that the Cambodian conflict was
entangled in the process of decolonization and the politics of the Cold War); see
also Pumawanty, supra note 9, at 65 (suggesting that the United States feared East
Timor becoming a communist state).
22. See Hilary Charlesworth & Mary Wood, "Mainstreaming Gender" in
International Peace and Security: The Case of East Timor, 26 YALE J. INT'L L.
313, 314 (2001) (recognizing the effect this violence has had on East Timor's men
and women during the years of occupation).
23. See Clark, supra note 5, at 80 ("Resistance would continue for the whole of
the period until 1999, in spite of claims that only a few 'rebels' remained.").
24. See Traub, supra note 4 (explaining that the Indonesian president was
forced from office in 1998).
25. See Linton, supra note 17, at 127 (highlighting the crisis was precipitated
by the Asia-wide currency crash).
26. See id. at 128 (noting that the internal problems experienced included
public unrest and civil disorder and eventually resulted in the resignation of then
President Suharto).
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East Timor would be given an opportunity to vote on an offer of
special autonomy27 within the Republic of Indonesia.28 Indonesia's
new leader, President Habibie, stated that should the East Timorese
reject the offer, he would recommend revocation of the 1976
Indonesian law that authorized integration.29 Shortly thereafter,
Indonesia and Portugal agreed that the Secretary General of the
United Nations would organize and conduct the popular
consultation.30 In response to rising tensions in East. Timor, the
United Nations Security Council established the United Nations
Mission in East Timor ("UNAMET") by resolution on June 11,
1999.31 The resolution not only dictated that UNAMET would
organize and conduct the consultation, but also that it was the
responsibility of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East
Timor.3 2
In spite of the UNAMET presence, in the months following the
resolution, peace was elusive and, due to escalating violence, the
United Nations twice postponed the referendum.33 However, when
the consultation took place on August 30, 1999, ninety-eight percent
27. See Purnawanty, supra note 9, at 66 (specifying that the offer provided for
home rule in areas other than defense, foreign affairs, and monetary policies).
28. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 21; see also McDonald, supra note 11, at 7
(referring to the announcement of the same as a "political bombshell");
Purnawanty, supra note 9, at 66 (asserting that the proposal of special autonomy
was given "to correct past mistakes and eradicate the heavy burden of political
instability and economic collapse" and that the continued occupation of East Timor
was politically disadvantageous for Indonesia).
29. See Simon Chesterman, East Timor in Transition: Self-determination,
State-building and the United Nations, 9 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 45, 60 (2002)
(reflecting the position that, based upon poor intelligence, Indonesian leaders
mistakenly believed that such an election would result in a vote for integration).
30. See Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR,
53rd Sess., para. 1, U.N. Doc A/53/951-S/1999/513 (1999) (giving the Secretary
General the power to establish a United Nations mission in East Timor for this
purpose).
31. S.C. Res. 1246, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4013th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/ 1246 (1999).
32. See id. para. 9 (stressing the necessity of this responsibility "in order to
ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way").
33. See Traub, supra note 4 (noting that the United Nations' wish to send in
foreign troops to supervise the voting process was thwarted by Indonesia).
Unarmed police officers were sent in their stead. Id.
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of those registered voted, with seventy-eight and one-half percent
choosing independence over the offer of autonomy.3 4 The intended
outcome of the referendum was "the delayed exercise of self-
determination by a colonial people;.., not a case of secession from
a state of which it was a legitimate part."35 Regrettably, it was not so
recognized by Indonesia and pro-integration forces and the situation
that followed was one of mass devastation and destruction.36
The chaos that ensued post-referendum lasted three weeks and was
christened by the Indonesian armed forces as "Operation Clean
Sweep. '37 The Indonesian military and militia allegedly received
orders to execute everyone over the age of fifteen; the "scorched
earth campaign" resulted in the burning and gutting of housing and
infrastructure alike.38 The resultant devastation and the animosity that
fueled the campaign were perhaps best exemplified by the graffiti
later observed on the walls of Dili, "A free East Timor will eat
stones. 39
Contrary to the U.N.'s original plan for a gradual transfer of
power, the post-referendum violence required immediate action.4 0 In
response to the devastation, widespread displacement of many East
Timorese and attacks on civilians and U.N. staff, the Security
Council issued Resolution 1264.41 Acting pursuant to the authority of
34. See Chopra, supra note 17, at 28.
35. Clark, supra note 5, at 76.
36. See Traub, supra note 4 (asserting that after the election, the militia moved
from town to town, engaging in acts of looting, burning, and murder).
37. See Chopra, supra note 17, at 27 (explaining that in the campaign, the
Indonesian military and militia executed hundreds and possibly thousands of East
Timorese).
38. See id. (noting that both males and females died as a result, and that more
than seventy-five percent of the country's population was displaced).
39. See Terry McCarthy, Hard Lessons: East Timor Must Avoid Becoming
Another Cambodia, TIME ASIA, Mar. 1, 2000, available at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asiabuzz/2000/03/O1/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
40. See Chopra, supra note 17, at 28.
41. See S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1264 (1999) [hereinafter Resolution 1264] (determining that the situation in
East Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security and listing the United
Nations' concerns and proposals for change).
2003] 1065
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,42 and with the consent of Indonesia,
the resolution authorized the establishment of the International Force
for East Timor ("INTERFET") to restore peace and security in East
Timor.43
II. UNTAET- RESOLUTION 1272
Slightly more than one month later, on October 25, 1999, the U.N.
Security Council issued Resolution 1272. 44  The Resolution
established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor.45 Requesting cooperation between UNTAET and INTERFET,
the resolution provided for the replacement of the latter 46 and
specified the mandate of UNTAET.47 Most notably, Resolution 1272
bestowed upon UNTAET the power to "exercise all legislative and
executive authority, including the administration of justice. 48
UNTAET thus became one of several "latter-day complex peace
support operations. ' 49 Such missions went beyond that of earlier,
traditional peacekeeping missions that were largely diplomatic,
dependent upon the consent and cooperation of the parties to the
42. See id. at para. 2 (stating that the United Nations possesses the authority to
create INTERFET by virtue of the power granted by Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to take preventive and enforcement
measures in order to maintain international peace or security).
43. See id. at para. 3. In authorizing the establishment of this multinational
force, the Resolution specifies the tasks it is to perform "to restore peace and
security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks
and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations ......
Id.
44. See S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1272 (1999) [hereinafter Resolution 1272].
45. See id. para. 1 (stating the general purposes of UNTAET).
46. See id. para. 9 (stating that this replacement would occur while taking into
account conditions on the ground).
47. See id. para. 2 (requiring that UNTAET: provide security and maintain law
and order; establish an effective administration; assist in the development of civil
and social services; ensure coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance,
rehabilitation and development assistance; support capacity building for self-
government; and assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable
development).
48. See id. para. 1.
49. See Thakur, supra note 21, at 117.
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conflict and in which the use of armed force was only permissible in
cases of self-defense." These were post-Cold War missions in
territories experiencing problems unique to internal conflict such as
anarchy, factionalism, and the "war-lord syndrome."" Requiring
more than the assistance of the blue helmets, their lawlessness,
chaos, and devastation made them better suited for "an overall blue
umbrella under which law and order [could be] maintained. 5 2
Earlier in the decade, the United Nations first tried its hand at
extensive governance, exercising functions delegated to it by the
Supreme National Council in Cambodia. 3 There, the United Nations
possessed broad-reaching authority, including control over the three
areas that would have been outside the purview of East Timorese
administration had it voted for integration.5 4 However, the delegation
limited the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia by requiring it
to follow the advice offered by the Supreme National Council.55 In
the wake of the Cambodian mission, the U.N. presence arguably
acted as a de facto government in Somalia, though the mission's
mandate did not clearly confer such authority.56 A system of
transitional governance was next required to quell the chaos that
ensued in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, though recognizing in that
50. See Jarat Chopra, Introducing Peace-Maintenance, in THE POLITICS OF
PEACE-MAINTENANCE, 1, 3-4 (Jarat Chopra ed., 1998) (providing a brief history of
disputes and diplomatic interventions).
51. Seeid. at6.
52. See id. at 8.
53. See Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance in Postconflict
Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 77 (2001) (describing the United Nations'
previous involvement in govemance).
54. See id.; see also supra note 27 (delineating the limitations on East
Timorese administration under intergration).
55. See Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia
Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991, Ann. 1 §A(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. 174, 189, 1663 U.N.T.S. 27, 69
(describing the relationship between Cambodia's Supreme National Council and
the United Nations), available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cambodia/comppol 1023199 1_annex 1 .html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2003).
56. See Chesterman, supra note 29, at 70 (stating that at the time, Somalia did
not have a functioning government and the Special Representative to the Secretary
General reinstated the former Somali penal code).
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instance the continuing sovereignty of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.57
The unique characteristic of the UNTAET mandate, however, has
not gone unnoticed. Writers observe this as the first time that
sovereignty has passed to the United Nations independent of any
competing authority.58 Though previous field missions encompassed
practical governance and administration, those same missions
involved a sharing of authority with a "host state."59 For this reason,
observers deem the creation of UNTAET as "a step forward of
millennial proportions."60
The extensive authority of UNTAET was conferred. exclusively
upon the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the
UNTAET Transitional Administrator.61 One man, Sergio Vieira de
Mello, received powers likened to that of "a pre-constitutional
monarch in a sovereign kingdom"62 and "those ,of a Roman
provincial governor."63 For his part, de Mello recognized the
difficulty of his position noting that "there are no positive models on
how to exercise such broad powers."64
One of the first items on the agenda of the Transitional
Administrator was to establish a rule of law in East Timor. Integral
57. See id. at 58.
58. See Chopra, supra note 17, at 29 (describing Resolution 1272 as
"bestowing sovereignty over East Timor to the U.N."); Carla, Bongiornio, A
Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the United
Nations in East Timor, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 623, 653 (2002) (noting that
the U.N.'s governmental responsibilities in East Timor were "independent of any
rival authority").
59. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1110.
60. See John Sanderson, The Cambodian Experience: A Success Story Still?, in
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMANENT
ENGAGEMENT 155, 159 (Ramesh Thakur & Albrecht Schnabel eds., 2001).
61. See Resolution 1272, supra note 44, para. 6 (stating that "the Transitional
Administrator... will be responsible for all aspects of the United Nations work in
East Timor and will have the power to enact new laws and regulations and to
amend, suspend or repeal existing ones").
62. Chopra, supra note 17, at 29.
63. See Sanderson, supra note 60, at 158.
64. See Sergio Viera de Mello, How Not to Run a Country: Lessons for the UN
from Kosovo and East Timor 3 (2000).
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to the success of the mission, it "sets a precedent for the future and
can be a central factor in the long-term development of...
democracy, economic development and respect for human rights. '65
Indeed, de Mello recognized the necessity of promptly addressing the
issue of law and order,66 the importance of which cannot be
underestimated as it is an essential prerequisite for lasting peace.67
Consequently, the issue was the primary focus of the first regulation
issued by the Transitional Administrator.
III.REGULATION 1999/1
Regulation 1999/1 entered into effect slightly more than two
months after the arrival of the first INTERFET troops 68 and one
month subsequent to the authorization of UNTAET. 69 The instrument
addressed the issue of the applicable law in East Timor, declaring
that, until replaced by regulation or legislation, the laws that applied
in East Timor prior to October 25, 1999, shall continue to apply.70 An
important caveat, however, was that those laws in conflict with
internationally recognized human rights standards,7' the fulfillment
65. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1149.
66. See de Mello, supra note 64, at 3.
67. See Mark Plunkett, Reestablishing Law and Order in Peace-Maintenance,
in THE POLITICS OF PEACE-MAINTENANCE, 61, 64 (Jarat Chopra ed., 1998).
68. See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 139 (supplying a timeline of international
involvement in East Timor).
69. See Reg. No. 1999/1, On The Authority of the Transitional Administration
in East Timor, UNTAET, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1991/1 [hereinafter Reg. No.
1999/1].
70. See id. § 3.1; see also Hansj6rg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction
of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 58 (2001) (stating that the phrase "the laws applied" was
chosen over that of "the applicable laws" to avoid giving post hoc legitimacy to
Indonesian rule).
71. See Reg. No. 1999/1, supra note 69, § 2 (noting that these standards are
particularly reflected in The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of December
10, 1948; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December
1966 and its Protocols; The International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966; The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965; The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women on 19 December
1979; The Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhumane or
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of the UNTAET mandate under Resolution 1272,72 or any regulation
or directive issued by the Transitional Administrator, would cease to
be valid.73 Leaving open the possibility for continuing review of the
law, six laws were specifically repealed 74 and capital punishment was
abolished.7 5
Whether the choice to continue to apply Indonesian law, mutatis
mutandis, enjoyed popular endorsement is a matter of debate.
Because Indonesia has neither signed nor ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,76 it appears to have been a
peculiar choice. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the selection
has been asserted to be "a controversial one." 7 However, others have
argued to the contrary, maintaining that the choice to apply
Indonesian law was sound 7  and that the selection enjoyed
widespread acceptance. 9 The former acting principal legal adviser to
UNTAET, Hansj6rg Strohmeyer, expressed a more dispassionate
position by stating that the selection of Indonesian law was a
practical one and noting the existence of objectors to the choice."s
Degrading Treatment or Punishment on 17 December 1984; The International
Convention on the Rights of the Child on 20 November 1989).
72. See Resolution 1272, supra note 44, para. 2 (listing the elements of the
mandate).
73. See Reg. No. 1999/1, supra note 69, § 3.1 (providing limitations).
74. See id. § 3.2 (repealing the following laws: Law on Anti-Subversion, Law
on Social Organizations, Law on National Security, Law on National Protection
and Defense, Law on Mobilization and Demobilization and Law on Defense and
Security); see also Linton, supra note 17, at 137 (providing criticism of the section
for its failure to provide law numbers and years associated with the laws in
question, resulting in uncertainty as to which laws are to be deemed repealed).
75. See Reg. No. 1999/l,supra note 69, § 3.3.
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
77. See Linton, supra note 17, at 137 (indicating that part of the controversy
stems from a lack of appreciation for the transitory nature of UNTAET's decision).
78. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1156.
79. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 13 (indicating that the acceptance
included East Timorese lawyers).
80. See Strohmeyer, supra note 70, at 58; see also Hansj6rg Strohmeyer,
Policing the Peace: Post-Conflict Judicial System Reconstruction in East Timor,
24 U.N.S. WALES J. 171, 174 (2001) [hereinafter, Strohmeyer, Policing the
Peace].
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Primarily, two practical reasons have been cited as the catalysts
for the adoption of Indonesian law, the first of which was to sidestep
a legal void in the early days of UNTAET's administration.8 As an
initial matter, a legal framework was necessary in order for
UNTAET to fulfill the responsibilities under its mandate.82
Additionally, the decision of which law would apply in post-
referendum East Timor needed to be made quickly in order to avert a
"legal vacuum."83 Such a void is often devastating in post-conflict
situations, when the population is divided and when poverty and
limited access to resources are prevalent problems.84 Not only can a
chaotic state serve as a criminal's playground, but its existence under
new leadership can also undermine public confidence in the same.85
Lawlessness in such situations can threaten progress in the
advancement of human rights86 and create a forum wherein evidence
of prior legal violations may be destroyed.87
The second reason cited in favor of applying Indonesian law was
that doing so would retain the system under which the attorneys in
the country studied and, thus, would circumvent the need for those
lawyers to be trained in a completely foreign legal system.8 While
such an argument is compelling in theory, it is possibly less
persuasive in the case of East Timor. In the days that preceded and
81. See Strohmeyer, Policing the Peace, supra note 80, at 174 (noting that
Indonesian laws would apply to the extent they were consistent with
internationally recognized human rights standards).
82. See Strohmeyer, supra note 70, at 47 (defining the challenges and
responsibilities deriving from that mandate).
83. See id. at 58 (identifying a legal framework as a prerequisite to the
establishment of judicial and other public institutions).
84. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1149 (citing economic crisis, factional
vendettas, and lack of law enforcement as characteristics of post-conflict
situations).
85. See id. (identifying the assertion of the rule of law as a prerequisite to the
success of all other reconstruction and state-building activities).
86. See id. (specifying that citizens, especially minorities, are highly vulnerable
during this period of time).
87. See Strohmeyer, supra note 70, at 47 (indicating that the failure to address
past and ongoing violations promptly can impede the broader objectives of the
operation).
88. See id. at 58 (indicating that virtually all of the local lawyers had obtained
their law degrees at domestic universities).
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followed the "scorched earth campaign," East Timor saw a veritable
diaspora of its legal community.89 In the aftermath of the departure of
Indonesian and pro-Indonesian judges and lawyers, fewer than ten
lawyers remained in East Timor, and these individuals were
considered to have been very inexperienced.90 Since no East
Timorese had ever held the position of judge or prosecutor under
Indonesian rule,9 and since the field of prospective attorney
candidates grew to include only sixty novices,92 intensive training of
the legal community was already the orderof the day.93
Of course, the application of Indonesian laws and procedure
provided continuity for more than merely the fledging legal
community. For many East Timorese, Indonesian law, which had
been in place for twenty-four years prior to the issuance of
Regulation 1999/1, was the only known legal system. However,
whether this enhances the argument in favor of its continued
application is questionable. In the aftermath of both Portuguese and
Indonesian rule, the East Timorese had an understandable distrust of
the legal system. 94 Further, the most recent East Timorese experience
with the legal system was littered with historic abuse by Indonesia."5
Indeed, it would be understandably difficult to establish respect for a
rule of law that was previously viewed as a tool of oppression.96
89. See id. at 50 (indicating that all those who were perceived as being
members of the administrative and intellectual privileged classes fled East Timor).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 53 (describing the task of identifying candidates for judicial or
prosecutorial office as "herculean").
92. See id. at 53-54 (explaining that these individuals were law graduates found
in part by the dropping of leaflets from airplanes advertising the need for their
services).
93. See id. at 55-56 (noting that the training of judges, lawyers, and public
defenders was provided via "quick impact" training courses, mandatory continuing
legal education, and through a mentoring plan).
94. See Strohmeyer, Policing the Peace, supra note 80, at 174 (reporting that
members of the East Timorese community found the 'very idea' of the continued
application of the Indonesian code objectionable).
95. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1158 (noting that, precisely because of
Indonesian abuse of the justice system, the importance of recruiting local judges
was heightened significantly).
96. See Strohmeyer, Policing the Peace, supra note 80.
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However, to better. understand the choice of applying Indonesian
law, it is important to review the options that were available to the
Transitional Administrator upon promulgation of Regulation 1999/1.
The experience in East Timor, as one in a relatively new genre of
complex peace support operations, was evolutionary in nature; rather
than rely solely on the military to provide security, as was common
in earlier missions, UNTAET needed the assistance of legal experts
in order to establish the rule of law.9" Lacking an applicable model
code and without time to devise a new one, 98 the decision arguably
consisted of either the "law of East Timor's 500-year long colonial
master" or that of the "nation that had illegally occupied and
brutalised East Timor for the [preceding] 25 years." 99 Thus, it is
important to be mindful throughout the subsequent review of its
application, that the decision to continue to apply the Indonesian
Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure may well have been
the lesser of the evils.
A. THE APPLICATION OF TRI-LAW
Before engaging in an analysis of the Indonesian Code under
UNTAET, it is important to evaluate the practical application of
Regulation 1999/1. In essence, the Regulation created "tri-law" for
the transitional state: a combination of the Indonesian Code,
international human rights standards, and those regulations issued by
97. See Plunkett, supra note 67, at 61 (explaining that the military has
traditionally been employed to deal with crises because it possesses the ability to
contend with violence while simultaneously providing logistical support of rapid
transportation and communications).
98. See Hansj6rg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work. The
U.N. and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor,
25 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 107, 112 (2001); see also Beauvais, supra note
16, at 1149 (noting that the Transitional Administrator needed to make its choice
"virtually immediately.., to provide security in the post-conflict phase").
99. See Linton, supra note 17, at 131 (describing INTERFET's choice of law
query). But see Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone:
Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 217 (2001) [hereinafter
Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone] (alleging that the use of the
Indonesian criminal justice code in the context of the serious crimes unit evidences
UNTAET's ambiguous attitude towards criminal prosecutions in East Timor).
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the Transitional Administrator.' 0 Compliance with the Regulation
necessitated a review of Indonesian law "through the lens of
international human rights instruments" and required that, in cases of
conflict, suitable substitutions be made."°" Thus, the aforementioned
international treaties did not apply per se; rather the existing laws
had to be read subject to them."0 2 Such a task is certainly not easy
and it is likely that even seasoned lawyers would not agree on the
outcome.0 3 However, the matter was neither a hypothetical for legal
minds to ponder, nor a question on a law school exam, but a
prerequisite to the daily application of the rule of law in East
Timor. 104
This issue is one that is of major significance with regard to the
United Nations' civilian police ("CIVPOL"), which, in November of
1999, assumed responsibility for the investigation of crime in East
Timor. °S Of necessity, CIVPOL operates independently from the
hierarchy within the United Nations and is expected to exercise
discretion in its arrests. 0 6 Additionally, it performs the important
function of training local forces integral to the goal of self-
sufficiency for East Timor. 07 By the very nature of its duties, which
100. See Strohmeyer, supra note 70, at 59 (specifying that Regulation 1999/1
required the application of Indonesian law as long as it did not conflict with
internationally recognized human rights standards and did not interfere with the
Security Council's mandate).
101. See id. (arguing that this was a "complex task").
102. See Linton, supra note 17, at 137.
103. See Hansj6rg Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary for East Timor:
Challenges of a Fledgling Nation, 11 CRIM. L.F. 259, 267 (2000) (noting that the
interpretation would be difficult for any lawyer).
104. See id. (submitting that tri-law was difficult to apply in practice because it
did not positively and unambiguously define the content of the laws).
105. See Linton, supra note 17, at 133 (explaining that CIVPOL took over this
responsibility from UNAMET mission members who had re-entered East Timor by
late September 1999).
106. See Plunkett, supra note 67, at 73 (indicating that CIVPOL is not integrated
within a military component).
107. See id. at 72 (addressing lessons learned from CIVPOL's experience in
Cambodia).
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demand public interaction, CIVPOL is arguably the face of
UNTAET in the community.° 8
Although the members of CIVPOL are not jurists but law
enforcement officers, operating underneath Regulation 1999/1, they
had to make the aforementioned legal assessment in order to perform
their daily functions. 0 9 It is therefore not surprising that CIVPOL,
along with the judiciary, "struggled" to perform its duties in
conformity with the Regulation 1 0 and that CIVPOL's enforcement of
unknown and inaccessible laws proved to be a "nightmare."'111
In addition to CIVPOL, new lawyers and judges, few of whom
were familiar with the practical application of human rights
standards, were also required to make like evaluations.' 12 Thus, with
the background of an already overburdened court system came the
additional responsibility of evaluating an ever-developing hybrid set
of laws. 3 This range of applicable laws made the work of the young
108. See id. at 73 (maintaining that CIVPOL, like any law enforcement agency,
strives to be representative of, responsible for, and accountable to the community
at large).
109. See Strohmeyer, supra note 98, at 49 n.10 (addressing the related issue that
States are often wary to contribute troops when the applicable laws are unclear).
110. See Strohmeyer, Policing the Peace, supra note 80, at 174-75 (noting that
CIVPOL did its best to comply with UNTAET Regulation 1999/1 in the daily
application of the existing legislation).
111. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 13 (specifying that CIVPOL was charged
with enforcing laws that could be subject to debate and rapid change).
112. See Linton, supra note 17, at 134 (stating that CIVPOL investigators were
as "equally confused" as these judges and lawyers and that the former had a
tendency to utilize their national requirements when unsure as to how to proceed
under the new system); see also Strohmeyer, supra note 98, at 112 (explaining that
the substantive criminal code and criminal procedure code in existence were
inconsistent with international human rights standards); Bongiornio, supra note 58,
at 676 (asserting that UNTAET has subsequently been criticized for its failure to
proactively abolish those provisions in the code that were contrary to international
human rights standards).
113. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 19 (claiming that in July 2001, there were
more than 600 outstanding cases from pre-September 1999); see also Linton,
Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone, supra note 99, at 203 (stating that the
hybrid laws were based on the legal system of Indonesia, international human
rights standards, and the amendments made by UNTAET).
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judiciary all the more challenging. 14 In light of all this, it is not
surprising that one critic found the restrictions placed upon the
application of Indonesian law, intended to correct the repressive and
unfair elements of the same, only "theoretically comforting."' 5 As
Hansj6rg Strohmeyer recounted, "[I]n practice, the formula
introduced by the United Nations' [administration] in. .. . East
Timor, which was aimed at avoiding a legal vacuum and ensuring
that the laws applied conformed to international standards at the
outset, led to considerable legal and political difficulties."' 6
B. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
In order for the transitional administration to utilize Indonesian
Code and Procedure, it would need to be familiar with the substance
of the same. Unfortunately, legal texts were only available in Bahasa
Indonesia and, because of the "scorched earth campaign," East
Timor had no surviving texts." 7 Thus, the transitional administration
was put in the difficult position of attempting to obtain the relevant
legislation from the state that, for all intents and purposes, had just
been expelled." 8 In addition, UNTAET relied on assistance from
Indonesian and international law firms, legal aid organizations, and
universities." 9 The difficulty in accessing the laws is illustrated by
the fact that the Dili Courthouse Library, responsible for serving as
the lead court in East Timor 20 and home to the serious crimes panel,
114. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 18 (discussing the language, physical
location, lack of resources, and lack of personnel problems the judges
experienced).
115. See Gordon Renouf, Some Features of the Legal System in East Timor, 2
(Mar. 2002) (paper presented to the delegates to the East Timor Legal
Coordination Symposium, Mar. 11-12, 2002, Darwin, Australia).
116. Strohmeyer, supra note 70, at 59.
117. See id. at 50 (claiming that additionally, court equipment, records, and
archives were also dislocated or burned).
118. See Strohmeyer, Policing the Peace, supra note 80, at 174.
119. See Strohmeyer, supra note 98, at 113.
120. See Reg. No. 200/11 On the Organization of Courts in East Timor, § 7.3,
UNTAET, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (2000) (declaring the Dili District
Court the only court to have jurisdiction for the whole of East Timor); see also id.
§ 10.1 (giving the court exclusive jurisdiction for the prosecution of serious
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did not acquire its own complete set of texts until December of
2000.12 Additionally, it is questionable as to whether there was ready
access to the declarations and treaties that delineated the pertinent
human rights standards. 122 The National Council of East Timorese
Resistance ("CNRT") had to specifically request the enumeration of
the same, as the organization had referenced the documents in its
"Magna Carta."' 123
To further complicate the situation, there were no Bahasa
Indonesia speaking lawyers in the United Nations Department of
Judicial Affairs. 24 Additionally, the U.N. international staff was
unfamiliar with Indonesian law and, because of the language barrier,
was incapable of remedying that problem.'25 Consequently, the laws,
once obtained, had to be translated before international mentors
could begin to assist the neophyte lawyers and judges with the
application of Regulation 1999/1.126 This delay perhaps seems to
refute the application of the Indonesian Code as a mechanism for
circumventing a legal vacuum and is one that, in all likelihood, could
be ill-afforded. 127
crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences,
and torture).
121. See Sarah Pritchard, United Nations Involvement in Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Efforts: New and Continuing Challenges in the Case of East Timor,
24. U.N.S. Wales L.J. 183, 188 (2001) (noting that, in the interim, many judges
were sitting without access to the law).
122. See Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Justice in Practice: Human
Rights in Court Administration, 10 (JSMP Thematic Report 1, Dili, East Timor,
Nov. 2001) (claiming that while this may seem unlikely in the information age, as
of late 2001, East Timorese judges did not have professional access to the
Internet).
123. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1151; compare with Chesterman, supra
note 29, at 70 (quoting Xanana Gusmdo's concerns: "What seems to be absurd is
that we absorb standards just to pretend we look like a democratic society and
please our masters of independence").
124. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 19.
125. See de Mello, supra note 64, at 4.
126. See Strohmeyer, supra note 70, at 56 (explaining that a "mentoring
scheme" was planned that would allow experienced international lawyers to serve
as "shadow judges" in civil law systems, although they would not exercise actual
judicial power).
127. See de Mello, supra note 64, at 3 (noting that "unlike other nation-building
tasks, law and order cannot wait").
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Additional difficulties emerged in efforts to train the local
professionals in accordance with the Indonesian structure,
particularly in light of the fact that Indonesia employs a civil law, or
inquisitorial system of justice." 8 Most helpful in the period of
transition, Australia hosted a two-week training session in Darwin
for East Timorese jurists.2 9 However, symptomatic of the
aforementioned difficulty, Australia itself employs the common law,
adversarial system. 3° Indeed, the inability to obtain mentors with
sufficient civil law backgrounds thwarted U.N. efforts to "[fulfill] its
objective of providing the newly appointed judges, prosecutors and
public defenders with sufficient legal training and assistance."'' In
light of East Timor's relationship with Indonesia, training in that
system also was not feasible, resulting in such arrangements as the
training of the judiciary in Portugal.'32 Finally, the limited amount of
legal training that was offered was primarily only available to
governmental employees; thus, attorneys affiliated with non-
governmental organizations, whose services were desperately needed
to assist in filling the human resources void in the fledgling legal
system, did not have a mechanism whereby they could familiarize
themselves with the Indonesian system.'33
C. THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL CODE AND CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
By including in Regulation 1999/1 the provision that those laws
contrary to international human rights standards would cease to
128. See Linton, supra note 17, at 137.
129. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 15.
130. See id. at 20-21.
131. Strohmeyer, supra note 70, at 56; see also Pritchard, supra note 121, at 188
(claiming that this is perhaps related to an observed lack of emphasis placed on
training in Indonesian procedure).
132. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 20 (explaining that the intense training the
judges received in Portugal lasted four months and was focused on the needs of the
East Timorese).
133. See Renouf, supra note 115, at 9 n.43 (noting that after June 2001, six non-
governmental officials attended the National Conference of Community Legal
Centres in Perth, Australia, and received some legal training).
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apply, such conflicts were arguably recognized to exist. 34 While the
instrument retained the possibility for further review, no such review
was, in fact, conducted. 35 Thus, the possibility for prosecution under
statutes that should have been abolished, as well as non-prosecution
for acts that should have been but were not incorporated into the
penal code, created very real problems in the application of the
law.'36 Additionally, the application of the code itself was not
necessarily a straightforward activity. The U.N. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention noted that Indonesian law includes a "multitude
of special laws adopted at any given period in the history of
Indonesia and never abrogated."'' 37
While the application of a pre-existing set of laws can be
extraordinarily beneficial in attempting to quickly establish a rule of
law, the overall effectiveness of the same may be challenged if the
law applied is incomplete. A solid legal framework is a necessary
prerequisite for the establishment and development of respect for
human rights. 38 In the case of Cambodia, its government noted that
"inadequacies in the operating legal system [can] delay the
rehabilitation of the country.' 1 39
Applying Regulation 1999/1 from this perspective is an even more
daunting task than in cases where the law is arguably in direct
134. See Strohmeyer, supra note 98, at 112 (acknowledging that the criminal
and procedural codes "contained numerous provisions inconsistent with
international human rights and criminal law standards"); see also Dioniosio Babo-
Soares, Law and Order: Judiciary Development in East Timor, 12 (paper prepared
for the Conference on Comparing Experiences with Post-Conflict Statebuilding in
Asia and Europe, Oct. 15-17, 2001, Denpasar, Bali-Indonesia) (noting that
Indonesian law was "popularly deemed" to be contrary to international human
rights standards by the UNTAET international staff).
135. See Linton, supra note 17, at 137.
136. See id. (noting that, "when inexperienced persons are put in positions of
power without adequate guidance, [it] can be [a] dangerous" situation).
137. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its Visit to
Indonesia, Jan. 31- Feb. 12, 1999, Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Item
11 (a) on the Provisional Agenda, para. 40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.2
[hereinafter Working Group visit to Indonesia].
138. See Plunkett, supra note 67, at 65 (claiming that an "effective and neutral
government" is also needed).
139. See id. (quoting the Kingdom of Cambodia, Implementing the National
Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia, 14 (Feb. 1995)).
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contradiction to international standards. In this case, the legal
analysis involved is made more complex, initially by the fact that its
need is less likely to be obvious. Thus, by its nature, the undertaking
is not one that judges can quickly perform in order to establish a
workable criminal code. 40
The subject of this part of the analysis of the Indonesian Criminal
Code, then, is not the prohibition or criminalization of conduct which
ought to be unfettered. Rather, it is a query as to whether the Code,
as written, suitably punishes reprehensible activity and sufficiently
protects victims. Quite likely, women were the most vulnerable
group in East Timor under the application of the Indonesian Criminal
Code.1 41 In her 1999 report on the mission to Indonesia and East
Timor, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes
and consequences, observed the Indonesian criminal justice system
to be gender insensitive. 42 The Special Rapporteur also observed
that, amongst the female population, there was a general distrust in
the criminal justice system and that this distrust resulted in the
limited reporting of crimes against women.'43
1. Domestic Violence
Of particular concern to the Special Rapporteur was the failure of
the Indonesian Criminal Code to meaningfully address acts of
violence against women, along with its failure to recognize domestic
violence as a distinct crime. 44 Thus, rather than facilitate
prosecutions for the same, promote awareness and education, and
provide proper outlets for victims, such acts of violence would only
140. See id. (explaining that the practice of creating new standards was
problematical and arduous).
141. See Report on Indonesia of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 55th Sess., Item 12(a) on the Provisional Agenda,
para. 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3 (1999) [hereinafter Report on
Indonesia] (pointing to the lack of training in human rights within the criminal
justice system as one of the reasons the rights of women are ignored).
142. See id. para. 49 (observing that the police must make their institutions more
accessible to women).
143. See id. (implying that the close association of the police with the army
contributed to this over-all distrust).
144. See id. para. 34.
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be tried as general crimes and were rarely prosecuted.1 45 Noting that
the Indonesian Criminal Code is void of many of the changes that
have assisted other countries in dealing with violence against
women, the Special Rapporteur stressed the importance of amending
the Code to "incorporate many of the standards advocated at the
international level with regard to violence against women. "146
Additionally, she encouraged Indonesia to reform its Code by
introducing domestic violence legislation in keeping with
international standards.14
Unfortunately, such compliance was not forthcoming. This was an
issue of vital importance for the women of East Timor where
domestic violence in the post-conflict state surfaced as a "significant
problem."'' 48 In fact, domestic violence became the country's most
prevalent crime, comprising forty-percent of all reported criminal
cases in the year 2000.149 One can draw a parallel from this to the
experiences in other post-conflict states where changes in societal
values, poor economies, increased access to weaponry, and other
factors have contributed to an increased risk of family violence. 5 0 In
fact, the findings of two Independent Experts appointed to determine
145. See id.
146. Id. para. 53.
147. See id. para. 116 (noting that the Special Rapporteur also remarked on the
absence of, and need for, legislation prohibiting sexual harassment).
148. See U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001,
East Timor (Mar. 4, 2002), §5 (quoting East Timor's chief minister, Mari Alkatiri,
who expressed concern over mounting domestic violence against women, claiming
that "cases of domestic violence are increasing" and that many "consider the
beating of women to be a private affair"), available at
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8300.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
149. Maggie O'Kane, Return of the Revolutionaries, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 15,
2001, available at http://www.tip.net.au/-wildwood/JanRev.htm (last visited Mar.
29, 2003).
150. See Marina Ajdukovik, Violence Against Women: Mental Health and
Human Rights Issues in the Aftermath of War, International Society for Health and
Human Rights (discussing the emotional and physical challenges suffered by
women in post-war nations), available at
http://ishhr.org/conference/articles/ajdukovic-marina.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2003); see also Martina Vandenberg, Women, Violence, and Tajikistan (examining
the various emotional factors women are forced to deal with following incidents of
violent behavior), available at
www.eurasianet.org/policy-forum/vand022001.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).
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the effect of armed conflict on women, in accord with Security
Council Resolution 1325, indicated that "violence during conflict is
inextricably linked to an increase in violence after conflict,
particularly in the form of domestic violence." '151 Additional factors
that contributed to the problem in East Timor included the return to
the home of men who participated in many years of guerrilla
warfare 5 2 and the high level of unemployment in post-conflict East
Timor, estimated at approximately eighty percent.'53 These dynamics
served to make East Timor a veritable breeding ground for acts of
domestic violence. Despite this, not only does the Indonesian
Criminal Code fail to specifically prohibit acts of domestic violence,
it also does not provide for the criminalization of threats of violence,
acts of attempted assault, 5 4 and threats to kill,'55 though all three
crimes are common to domestic violence prosecutions. As a result,
the Code itself was observed as an impediment to efforts to address
the problem of domestic violence in East Timor.'56 This difficulty is
151. ELISABETH REHN & ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF, WOMEN, WAR AND PEACE:
THE INDEPENDENT EXPERTS' ASSESSMENT 14 (2002), available at
http://www.unifem.undp.org/resources/assessment/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
The difficulties experienced in East Timor caused then Special Representative of
the Secretary-General Vieira de Mello to initiate a nation-wide campaign against
domestic violence. Id. at 15.
152. See O'Kane, supra note 149 (discussing possible causes of violent behavior
in men against women).
153. See Charlesworth & Wood, supra note 22, at 315 (providing statistics on
the economic condition of East Timor); see also World Bank, Gender Based
Violence: The Case of Vietnam (1999) (noting that in a recent study, economic
hardship was noted to be one of the two greatest contributing factors to domestic
violence), available at
http://www.worldbank.org.vn/data-pub/reports/Bankl/rep4/vibO01 .htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2003).
154. See Kate Halliday & Diane Farsetta, East Timorese Women Still Await
Legal Protections, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, WI), Nov. 28, 2001, available at
http://etan.org/et2001c/november/25-30/28etwomn.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2003).
155. Amnesty International, East Timor: Justice Past, Present and Future 2
(2001) [hereinafter Amnesty, 2001 Report (discussing inadequacies in East
Timor's justice system subsequent to U.N. intervention)], available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA570012001 (last visited Mar. 29,
2003).
156. See Halliday & Farsetta, supra note 154.
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no doubt exacerbated by the fact that the Indonesian Code also
effectively sanctions marital rape. 57
2. Rape
"Any person who by using force or threat of force forces a woman
to have sexual intercourse with him out of marriage shall, being
guilty of rape, be punished by a maximum imprisonment of twelve
years."' 58 This statute, along with other Indonesian statutes
delineating sex offences, remained in place throughout the UN's
transitional administration of East Timor. In fact, Regulation 2000/15
specifically sanctioned the continued application of this provision. 159
This occurred in spite of the fact that the statute allows for rape to be
committed within the confines of marriage. Such a limitation may
have untold effects on East Timorese women, beyond that previously
referred to in the context of domestic violence. It is well documented
that under Indonesian rule, East Timorese women were "forced into
'marriages' with members of the occupation army."160 Thus, for
these women, continued application of the law has the potential to
legitimize cases of sexual assault in instances where the perpetrator
is the same individual who coerced the victim into marriage.
As noted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women,
its causes and consequences, the legal definition of rape under the
Indonesian Criminal Code is "limited to forced penetration of the
157. See Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone, supra note 99, at 147
n.88 (citing Article 285 of the Indonesian Criminal Code).
158. See id. (providing the specific language of Article 285 of the Indonesian
Criminal Code).
159. See Reg. No. 2000/15 On Establishment of Panels with Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, § 9, UNTAET, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 [hereinafter REG. No. 2000/15] (stipulating that the laws
of East Timor would apply to sexual offenses).
160. Charlesworth & Wood, supra note 22, at 315; see, e.g., Alternative
Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for Improving
the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 9(a),
§ I.A.(Indonesia) para. 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998) (noting that the
Special Rapporteur had received a large number of complaints regarding sexual
violence in East Timor, including forced marriages, and that no cases had resulted
in prosecution).
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vagina by the penis," and thus does not cover other forced sexual
actions.' 6' This limitation is hardly in compliance with international
standards as delineated by the respective Court in cases before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 62 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 163 One such case noted
nearly universal acceptance, in both adversarial and inquisitorial
systems, of the fact that the definition of rape includes the
penetration of the vagina or the anus by the penis or any other
object. 64 The limitation of the Indonesian Criminal Code is
particularly disturbing in light of examples wherein women have
been sexually violated by objects, such as guns, in conflict and post-
conflict situations. 65 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Special
Rapporteur stressed the need for a broader definition of rape and
recommended amending the rape provision in the Indonesian
Criminal Code. 166 The statute, as written, fails to adequately protect
female victims from being sexually violated by alternative means
and makes no provision whatsoever for male victims.
Another troubling aspect in this area is the application of the
Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure. The Code provides that:
"The testimony of one witness is not sufficient. to prove that a
161. Report on Indonesia, supra note 141, para. 36.
162. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1192, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, 'U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing the tribunal under the
jurisdiction of the United Nations).
163. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M.
1602, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the tribunal under the jurisdiction of the
United Nations); see also Linton, supra note 17, at 170 (discussing rape cases
adjudicated before the international tribunals, noting that international law defines
rape "as a 'physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive' (citing Akayesu,
'
Case No. IT-96-4-T (Sept. 2,
1998)).
164. See Linton, supra note 17, at 170 (citing Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-
T1O (Dec. 10, 1998) [181]; 38 I.L.M. 317, 355). The case also found that "forced
penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ constitutes a most humiliating
and degrading attack upon human dignity." Id.
165. See REHN & SIRLEAF, supra note 151, at 9 (providing specific examples of
violence against women).
166. See Report on Indonesia, supra note 141, para. 116 (recommending as well
that the government should accelerate this process of law reform).
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defendant is guilty of the act of which he is charged." 167 Thus, under
the Code, a prima facie case of rape may not be established in the
absence of corroboration, including the testimony of two
witnesses. 168 Though the Code was ultimately replaced by Regulation
2000/30, which did much to remedy the deficiencies in this area, 69
the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure, with its corroboration
requirements, was applicable for nearly the first year of UNTAET's
administration.
3. Torture
In the early days of the East Timor's post-conflict state, there
existed a gap between de facto and de jure control, with the latter
bestowed upon the CNRT. 170 The status of the same arguably
continued, to a certain degree, under UNTAET governance. In
particular, unofficial "security forces," comprised of members of
groups which included the CNRT, were noted in a 2001 report to the
Transitional Administrator.'7 ' To some extent, CNRT groups enjoyed
their remaining authority courtesy of CIVPOL and UNTAET, who
allowed the "irregular CNRT security groups" to screen returning
refugees to determine whether the same were associated with
Indonesian intelligence or militias.7 2 However, the screenings, at
times, deteriorated to include maltreatment, most notably in the case
of a beating and stabbing of a militia member. 73
167. Id. para. 38 (quoting Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 185,
para. 2).
168. See id. para. 53 (citing the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure). This
shifts the burden of proof onto the victim and ensures that the victim is subject to
trial. Id. para. 38.
169. See Reg. No. 2000/30 on Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 34.3,
UNTAET, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/30 (removing the corroboration
requirement and precluding admissibility of the victim's sexual history), available
at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/reg200030.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2003).
170. See Chopra, supra note 17, at 32.
171. See Bongiornio, supra note 58, at 651-52 (describing the efforts of
UNTAET to monitor unofficial security forces that were not accountable to legal
bodies).
172. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 148, § 1(c).
173. See id.
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The existence of such forces and their resultant ability to mistreat
returning refugees is particularly relevant to a discussion on the
crime of torture vis-a-vis applicable law in East Timor. The United
Nations criticized the Indonesian Criminal Code for its failure to
prohibit torture in full compliance with its definition in the
Convention Against Torture. 74 Specifically, the Convention Against
Torture provides that the perpetrator inflict the punishable act "by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official."' 75 In contrast, the Indonesian Criminal Code limits its
definition of torture to acts by public officials in criminal cases
where the act is used to procure a confession or statement'7 6 and thus
does not preclude torture outside of the process of criminal
investigation.'77
Consequently, as the actions of the irregular CNRT sponsored
security forces were not related to the investigation of a criminal
case, they do not fall within the purview of the Indonesian statute.
Turning then to the Convention Against Torture, which is both
included in the list of instruments which reflect internationally
recognized human rights standards in Section 2 of Regulation 1999/1
and is also recognized as customary international law,' the acts
arguably are also not covered. In order for the maltreatment by the
irregular forces to fall within the purview of torture, as defined in the
Convention Against Torture, either its members would need to be
recognized as "public officials" or their punishable acts be deemed to
have occurred with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.
The former appears unlikely in light of the fact that the CNRT forces
174. See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture:
Indonesia, para. 9, 27th Sess., Nov. 12-23 2001, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/XXVII/Concl.3
(2001) (assessing the country's compliance with the United Nations torture
regulations). The statute is subject to further disapproval due to its failure to
provide for penalties which adequately reflect the severity of the crime. Id. para.
10(a).
175. Convention Against Torture, art. I(I), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 UNTS 85, with changes at 24 ILM 535, entered into force June 26, 1987.
176. See Linton, supra note 17, at 168.
177. See Summary Record of the 492nd Meeting: Indonesia, para. 20,
Committee Against Torture, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.492 (2001).
178. See Linton, supra note 17, at 166-67.
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were not accountable to the legal administration. 7 9 With regard to
the latter, successful prosecution would also prove difficult. The
available information is that the screening of the returning refugees
by the CNRT was merely "permitted" to take place by CIVPOL and
local UNTAET officials. 80 At best, this proves consent or
acquiescence to the screening, not the punishable acts.
The fact that the definition of torture under customary
international law fails to encompass maltreatment inflicted by private
actors, has resulted in some regarding the same as too restrictive.' 8'
Indeed, in its adoption of Regulation 2000/15, UNTAET chose to
utilize two definitions for the crime of torture, neither of which limits
the application of the same to acts of state officials.'82 While this may
appear to address the aforementioned acts of the CNRT irregulars,
the regulation was not adopted until June 6, 2000. Thus, operating
without the same as "black letter law," CIVPOL had no cause to
either document or prevent such activity insofar as it related to the
crime of torture prior to June 2000. Further, in light of the fact that
the definitions included in the regulation are more expansive than
that of customary international law, post hoc application of the
definitions contravenes the principle of nullem crimen, nulla poena,
sine lege. "I
4. Defamation and the Case of Takeshi Kashiwagi
While the aforementioned gaps in the Indonesian Code present a
very real problem, they comprise only part of the difficulty
associated with the application of the Indonesian Criminal Code.
Equally problematic is the presence of certain statutes in the Code
that are offensive to international standards. While numerous laws
179. See Bongiornio, supra note 58, at 652-53.
180. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 148, § 1(c).
181. See, e.g., Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone, supra note 99,
at 221.
182. See REG. No. 2000/15, supra note 159, §§ 5.2 (d), § 7.1 (providing two
separate definitions of torture).
183. See Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone, supra note 99, at 220
(stressing the importance of the requirement that "no one can be tried for acts that
were not criminal at the time they were committed").
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were repealed by Regulation 1999/1,184 many more remained in
place, potentially subject to either prosecutorial and judicial
discretion or subsequent regulation.185 Of particular relevance is the
charge of defamation, delineated in Chapter XVI, Articles 310-21 of
the Indonesian Criminal Code.'86 In the Chapter, one finds that
defamation may be established in the absence of publication,
provided that an "obvious intent" to publicize is shown.'87 As a
result, under Indonesian law, one can be convicted of attempt to
defame.'88 Further, the law provides that the truth is not always a
defense, and in fact may only be utilized as such when a judge so
decides, or when the accused is a public official and the charge is
related to an official act. 8 9 In addition, if the defamed person is
ultimately acquitted of the alleged act, the acquittal is deemed to be
"perfect proof' of the untruth of the fact. 9 ° Under the Indonesian
Code, one can defame the dead,' 9' punishments are enhanced by one-
third when the defamed individual is a public official, 192 and only the
defamed individual may bring charges, except in the case of a public
official. 193
Historically, Indonesia's criminalization of the charge of
defamation has not existed in the absence of international censure.
Used as a tool to silence political opposition and criticism, it has
been the subject of investigation by the Special Rapporteur on the
184. See Reg. No. 1999/1, supra note 69, § 3.2 (repealing several sections of
Indonesian law). The effectiveness of this has been subject to criticism. See Linton,
supra note 17, at 137 n.55 (stating that "the Regulation does not specify any years
or law numbers and it is not clear which laws are referred to").
185. See Linton, supra note 17, at 137 (noting that treaties are not directly
applicable, so existing laws are read subject to them).
186. See INDON. CRIM. CODE arts. 310-21 (defining and describing the crime of
defamation).
187. See id. art. 310. The offense is punishable by a period of imprisonment of
up to nine months. Id.
188. See id.
189. See id. art. 312.
190. See id. art. 314.
191. INDON. CRIM. CODE arts. 320-21.
192. See id. art. 316.
193. See id. art. 319.
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protection and promotion of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression. 194 The United Nation's Commission on Human Right's
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has found its application to
be contrary to the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights'95 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 96 the first two documents referenced in
Regulation 1999/1.197
Takeshi Kashiwagi, a Japanese journalist and long-time activist
for East Timorese independence, was imprisoned in East Timor in
the summer of 2000 under charges of defaming and threatening to
kill Xanana Gusmdo; then the CNRT leader. 98 In the period prior to
his arrest, Kashiwagi. had accused upper level members of the CNRT
of conspiring with foreign powers to obtain an advantage in East
Timor's first representative government. 99 CIVPOL subsequently
194. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Abid Hussain, pursuant to
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/45, UNGAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
52d Sess., paras. 49-54 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996) (discussing the
imprisonment of Nuku Suleiman. for having disseminated stickers which alleged
that human rights violations were committed by the Indonesian president's security
forces).
195. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)(A), U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 19 (1948) (declaring that everyone has the right to
freedom of expression).
196. See ICCPR, supra note 76, art. 19(2) (stating that everyone has the right to
freedom of expression); see also Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/31 (1994) (finding the detention of Nuku Suleiman to be arbitrary,
category II); Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, para. 9,
Commission on Human Rights, 49th Sess., Item 10 of the provisional agenda, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/24 (1993) (delineating the parameters of category II).
197. See Reg. No. 1999/1, supra note 69, §2 (referencing the Universal
Declaration of Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
198. See Shinichi Murakami, Japanese Activist Fights Corruption in East
Timor, ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Oct. 26, 2000 (describing the arrest of Takeshi
Kashiwagi), available at http://www.etan.org/et2000c/november/1-4/Ojapan.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2003).
199. See id. CNRT's association with UNTAET and the legitimacy derived
therefrom were observed prior to the dissolution of the faction. See U.S. Dep't of
State, supra note 145, § l(f) (describing the close relationship between CNRT and
UNTAET).
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arrested Kashiwagi on August 22, 2000200 pursuant to warrants
issued by the Dili District Court that did not specifically name the
alleged victim. 20' The transcript of Kashiwagi's interview by
CIVPOL, performed on the date of arrest, reveals that the journalist
was joined at the questioning by a public defender and that he
admitted to no more than criticism of the CNRT and its leader,
Xanana Gusmdo.2 °2
On the day following his arrest, a Dili District Court Investigating
Judge issued a thirty-day detention order, in which the charge of
threatening was omitted.20 3 Kashiwagi, thus, remained in prison on
the single charge of criminal defamation, a charge that is
incompatible with international standards.2 4 Although Kashiwagi's
assigned counsel made two subsequent applications for his release,
200. See Bruno Kahn, The Kashiwagi Case, AGIR POUR TIMOR (Sept. 29, 2000)
(on file with author) (depicting the warrants associated with Kashiwagi's arrest, his
release order, a transcript of an interview of Kashiwagi at CIVPOL headquarters,
and Kahn's own interview with the journalist).
201. See id. (referencing the charge stated on Kashiwagi's arrest warrant).
202. See id. (describing Mr. Kashiwagi's interrogation).
203. See id.; see also Amnesty, 2001 Report, supra note 155, at 25 (stating that
the charge, in fact, was not a part of the Indonesian Criminal Code and, thus, was
contrary to the applicable law); C. Vasconcelos, Briefing to the Annual Conference
of the International Association of Prosecutors, (Sept. 2001) (briefing presented
Sept. 2-7, 2001, Sydney, Australia (confirming the accuracy of the Amnesty
International Report)), at http://www.etan.org/et2001c/august/26-31/25cv.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2003). But see East Timor Action Network/U.S., East Timor: U.N.
Officials Dismiss Amnesty's Critical Report as 'Exaggeration' (July 31, 2001)
(describing Amnesty International's report as exaggerated), at
http://www.etan.org/et2001c/august/01-4/00un.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
The charge might have been an example of the U.N. legal officers of the UNTAET
drawing on their knowledge of the laws of their home countries, a hallmark of the
UNTAET in its early days. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 13.
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text; see also U.S. Dep't of State,
supra note 148, § 2(a) (describing the Kashiwagi case and noting that a court held
he had a legal right to compensation for his arrest); Amnesty 2001 Report, supra
note 155, at 23-25 (describing the Kashiwagi case and its inconsistencies with
international law); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 195, art. 19
(declaring that everyone has a right to freedom of expression); ICCPR, supra note
76, art. 19(2)-(3) (protecting the freedom of expression).
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neither were successful 20 5 and neither raised the issue that the
outstanding charge was contrary to international standards.2 6 It also
seems unlikely that either application raised the issue that
Kashiwagi's continued detention was in contradiction with the
relevant applicable Code.207 The case ultimately came to the attention
of the Transitional Administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who, on
September 7, 2000, issued Executive Order 2000/2 that
decriminalized the charge of defamation.2 08 Although the General
Prosecutor requested Kashiwagi's unconditional release the next day,
Kashiwagi received only a conditional release on September 9.209
After calling the Court's attention to the Executive Order,
Kashiwagi's release, became unconditional on the twentieth of
September. 210  Kashiwagi later received a letter from Acting
Transitional Administrator Jean-Christian Cady apologizing for his
unlawful arrest and detention and advising Kashiwagi to file a
request for compensation for the same.2"
205. See Amnesty 2001 Report, supra note 155, at 24 (noting that the court
denied Kashiwagi's applications on the ground that he might commit defamation
again, or commit other crimes).
206. See E-mail from Takeshi Kashiwagi, to Megan Fairlie (Dec. 13, 2002) (on
file with author) (noting that neither of Mr Kashiwagi's lawyers raised the issue of
his detention being contrary to international standards). When asked whether either
of the public defenders associated with his case ever raised this issue, Takeshi
Kashiwagi responded, "Neither did. Both might be unaware of it." Id.
207. See Amnesty, 2001 Report, supra note 155, at 24 (noting that there was no
legal ground for Kashiwagi's detention). As UNTAET, at this point, had yet to
promulgate a code of criminal procedure, Indonesian procedure applied. The same
allowed for pre-trial detention only in cases wherein an individual is charged with
a crime for which the associated penalty is imprisonment of five years or more. Id.
Kashiwagi's charge carried a maximum penalty of nine months imprisonment. Id.
208. See On the Decriminalisation of Defamation, Executive Order 2000/2,
UNTAET, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/ORD/2000/2 (2000) (on file with author)
(decriminalizing defamation). A review of the relevant CIVPOL records reveals
that the Order was issued on the same day that the Transitional Administrator
requested Mr. Kashiwagi's criminal file. See Kashiwagi Case- CIVPOL records
(on file with author).
209. See Amnesty 2001 Report, supra note 155, at 25 (noting that Mr.
Kashiwagi received only a conditional release on September 9, 2000).
210. See Murakami, supra note 198.
211. See Letter from Jean-Christian Cady, Acting Transitional Administrator,
UNTAET, to Takeshi Kashiwagi (Sept. 27, 2000) (on file with the American
University International Law Review).
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Kashiwagi's subsequent civil case, brought against the Minister of
Justice, the Transitional Administrator, the Investigating Judge, and
two of the General Prosecutors, is illustrative of the many problems
associated with the application of Regulation 1999/1.212 The basis of
Kashiwagi's claim for unlawful imprisonment was not the
aforementioned incompatibility of his charge with either
international standards or Indonesian Procedure, but rather that,
contrary to the Code, the allegedly defamed individual did not bring
the complaint against him.213 The fact that non-compliance with the
requirements of the charge, rather than the invalidity of the charge
itself, formed the basis of Kashiwagi's claim is likely illustrative of
the fact that the East Timorese bar was, at the time, in its nascent
stages.
After unsuccessfully challenging the issue upon which the suit was
brought, 214 defense arguments focused on such areas as the Court's
lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case before it. 2 5 The
defense proffered by the Investigating Judge was more than
disturbing: ignoring the fact that Kashiwagi had not brought his
claim as a result of the Executive Order 2000/2, the judge asserted
that the same was an illegitimate order and that he had acted in
accordance with his duties.216
In finding for the plaintiff, the District Court noted non-
compliance with the Indonesian Criminal Code, in that the details of
the investigation, received into evidence, failed to include a
complaint made by the defamed individual.217 However, the Court
212. See Bongiornio, supra note 58, at 672 (describing the confusion that
resulted from conflicting claims by the defendants and other interested parties in
Kashiwagi's civil suit).
213. See id. at 671 (describing the legal basis for Kashiwagi's civil claim).
CIVPOL may have been under the impression that the public official exception
applied. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining the public official
exception).
214. The defense that the public official exception applied was raised but then
rejected by the Dili District Court in the early stages of the litigation. E-mail from
Takeshi Kashiwagi to Megan Fairlie (Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with author).
215. Bongiorno, supra note 58, at 673 (alleging that the matter should have been
brought before a non-existent administrative court).
216. Id. at 672.
217. See id. at 675 (noting that Kashiwagi prevailed because there was no
allegation of a victim/witness who claimed injury).
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did not limit its holding accordingly. Rather, it also found that
Executive Order 2000/2 was unlawful and ordered it to be set
aside.2"8 Amongst the culpable defendants, the Court included the
Transitional Administrator who issued the executive order "which
carried implications for the legal status of the former
accused/plaintiff..., and which conflicted with the basis of the
criminal code."2 19 The Court's patent misunderstanding of both the
legitimacy 20 and ramifications21 of the executive order have been
described as "alarming" and "bizarre."' 222
As a result, the status of the charge of criminal defamation in East
Timor remains unclear. 223 Despite the Dili District Court decision,
many assume that Executive Order 2000/2 resolved the issue.224
However, it does not appear that anyone has revisited the District
Court decision to set the executive order aside, except insofar as to
218. See id. at 673 (noting that the court struck down Executive Order 2000/2).
219. Id. at 675.
220. See Reg. No. 1999/1, supra note 69, § 3.1 (specifying not only that
regulations and directives in conflict with the applicable law result in the invalidity
of the latter, but also stating that the applicable laws shall continue to apply "only
in so far as they do not conflict" with international standards). Thus, arguably, no
positive act was required to invalidate the criminal charge of defamation. See
supra note 200 and accompanying text (noting that Kashiwagi's detention on a
charge of criminal defamation was contrary to international standards).
221. Translation of Civil Appeal 2001/01 (Aug. 20, 2001) (on file with author)
(translating the decision in which the Court of Appeal noted that "the executive
decision issued by Sergio Vieira de Melo [sic], far [from] being the cause of
Takeshi's damages, was effectively the fact that ended the illegal imprisonment he
was subjected to"). It is possible that the District Court's holding with regard to the
Transitional Administrator and the Executive Order may have been, in part, the
result of the Court's perception of the manipulation of the law, a problem that
reared its head earlier in the transitional administration. See Interview by Susanna
Lobez with Pene Mathew, Senior Lecturer, Australian National University, Faculty
of Law, Take Four Legal Systems and Stir!, RADIO NATIONAL (July 11, 2000), at
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/lawrpt/stories/s150455.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2003).
222. See Bongiomio, supra note 58, at 675.
223. Id. (noting that the court set aside Executive Order 2000/2).
224. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 148, §1 (e) (reporting that the
Indonesian statute was subsequently revoked by UNTAET); Linton, supra note 17,
at 137 (noting that the Kashiwagi case led to an "immediately effective" executive
order nullifying the offence).
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observe that the order actually assisted Kashiwagi.225 Certainly, the
likelihood of the UNTAET administration issuing additional charges
of criminal defamation was virtually non-existent.22 6 However, if left
as a valid part of the criminal code, the possibility for negative future
ramifications remains.227
Thus, the Kashiwagi case is symbolic of the difficulties
experienced as a result of Regulation 1999/1.28 A young judiciary
and prosecutorial staff, along with CIVPOL, were ineffectual in
applying the regulation to the existing criminal code.22 9 As a result,
an individual was unjustly imprisoned and the United Nations was
placed in the embarrassing position of having facilitated his arrest by
CIVPOL, on the authority of a warrant issued by a court operating
under UNTAET's administration. 30 In addition, UNTAET became
subject to a subsequent civil action, wherein the inherent inability of
the judiciary to master the meaning and application of Regulation
1999/1 was further demonstrated.'
225. See Translation of Civil Appeal 2001/1, supra note 221.
226. See Letter from Heng Sou Kaw, Acting Commissioner UNPOL, to Takeshi
Kashiwagi (May 1, 2002) (on file with author) (stating that "the SRSG has by
executive order revoked all of the relevant sections of the Indonesian Penal Code
that applies to the [Kashiwagi] case"). "As a result, such action cannot be taken
against [Kashiwagi] or any other person under the applicable laws in East
Timor ..... " Id. The letter further states that "the circumstances that led to
[Kashiwagi's] unlawful arrest and detention will not happen again under the
present laws in force in East Timor." Id.
227. See Strohmeyer, supra note 98, at 48 n.8 (asserting that new states tend to
retain the legislation enacted during the period of transition). The situation in the
Kingdom of Cambodia certainly supports this contention. The criminal code and
code of criminal procedure, instituted by the U.N. transitional authority in
Cambodia in 1992 and 1993, respectively, remain in place to date. U.S. Dep't of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2001, Cambodia, §1 (d)
(2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drI/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8283.htm (last
visited May 9, 2003).
228. See Linton, supra note 17, at 134-35 (describing the problems concerning
East Timor's legal regime).
229. See id.
230. See id. at 137 (describing the Kashiwagi case).
231. See Bongiornio, supra note 58, at 672 (describing the civil case Kashiwagi
brought against UNTAET).
1094 [18:1059
CASE FOR A MODEL CRIMINAL CODE
5. Additional Areas of Concern
The Kashiwagi case, thus, creates concern with regard to the
continued application of other problematic provisions in the
Indonesian Code.232 After its visit to Indonesia in 1999, the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention remarked upon numerous statutes in
the Code that the Indonesian government needed to address.233 In
particular, the group observed that various statutes failed to include a
clear mens rea and the legislature drafted the laws in a vague and
general manner that resulted in the potential for abuse in their
application.234 Regulation 1999/1 did not specifically repeal any of
the four chapters cited by the Working Group.235
On the contrary, at least one individual was improperly detained
under one of the chapters cited by the Working Group. 236 Authorities
held Afonso da Costa, a militia suspect, for approximately six
months in 2000, presumably in violation of crimes against the
security of the state, pursuant to Chapter I, Article 107 of the
Indonesian Criminal Code. 37 The UNTAET Office of the Principal
Legal Advisor informed Amnesty International, however, that in
light of the fact that Regulation 1999/1 repealed the Anti-subversion
Law, by extension, Article 107 should also no longer apply. 38 This
scenario exemplifies not only the continued application of a law that
232. See Linton, supra note 17, at 137 (noting that "[w]ithout precise instruction
on what is or is not an internationally acceptable legal provision, it remains at the
discretion of the relevant prosecutor whether a certain offence will be pursued").
233. See Working Group visit to Indonesia, supra note 137, para. 50 (citing the
respective chapters on crimes against security of the State, crimes against the
dignity of the President and Vice-President, crimes against public order, and
crimes against Public Authority).
234. See id. (noting that the potential targets for such abuse included the press,
political opposition, and trade unions).
235. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (listing the laws that Regulation
1999/1 repealed).
236. See Working Group Visit to Indonesia, supra note 137, para. 50 (including
crimes against the security of the state in its list of provisions).
237. See Amnesty 2001 Report, supra note 155, at 25 (noting that the U.N.
Peacekeeping Forces never actually clarified the specific charges behind da
Costa's arrest).
238. See id. (commenting that Article 107 was still in the statute book when
forces arrested da Costa).
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should have been repealed, but also the complexity involved in
applying Regulation 1999/1.239 While the charge in question is
Article 107 of Chapter I of the Indonesian Criminal Code, the
repealed Anti-subversion Law was Presidential Decree 11/1963.240
Thus, the connection shared by the two laws does not derive from
their affiliation within the Code and is arguably not readily apparent.
IV.THE NEED FOR A MODEL CODE
The difficulties experienced in UNTAET's application of the
Indonesian Criminal Code and the Indonesian Code of Criminal
Procedure, which ranged from a basic lack of access to the texts that
delineated the controlling law to the incarceration of individuals
under statutes that are contrary to international standards, serve to
make the case for a model code. Armed with the same, future
transitional administrations would be better able to comply with
Sergio Vieira de Mello's admonition: be prepared.2 4' A ready-made
code would enhance public confidence in the relevant administration
in that it would enable the administration to focus on the job at hand
rather than on how to do the job.242
Of course, these would fail to be pertinent arguments if the United
Nations were not to again assume the responsibility of the
transitional administration.243 In fact, when presented with the
possibility of transitional governance in Afghanistan, Lakhdar
Brahimi, the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative to the
country, stated that the prevailing lesson from previous missions is
that they should not be repeated.2 44 While that is a possibility,2 45 it is
239. See supra notes 228-231 and accompanying text (discussing the
problematic application of Regulation 1999/1).
240. See Working Group visit to Indonesia, supra note 137, para. 42 (stating that
Presidential Decree 11/1963 deals with detaining persons).
241. See de Mello, supra note 64, at 2.
242. See id. at 3 (noting that work on the set-up "makes the UN appear slow and
more dedicated to itself than those it is mandated to assist").
243. See Mark Riley, We Won't Clean up the Mess, Says U.N., SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Oct. 19, 2001 (noting that a transitional administration was
suggested for Afghanistan), available at
http://old.smh.com.au/news/0110/19/world/world2.html (last visited May 5, 2003).
244. See id.
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far from certain and, in fact, many subscribe to the opposite point of
view. 246 Commentators note that "[t]he most common form of
contemporary international insecurity calls for complex [peace
support operations] as the tool of choice of the international
community 247 and it is likely that the U.N.'s involvement in
transitional governance will intensify.248
Thus, many camps call for a "generic legal framework. ' 249 Support
for the same is understandable. In cases of transitional governance, it
is a necessary pre-requisite for effective and immediate international
assistance.25 ° It would also be a means for assuring that the arrests
and prosecutions, initiated under the auspices of the U.N., are aligned
with the U.N.'s own standards.25'
However, amongst those who advocate for a code, there is a lack
of unanimity as to the type of code that is required. While some
promote the idea of limiting the model code to procedural issues and
serious crimes,252  others have recognized the imperative of
245. See Brahimi Report, supra note 1, para. 78 (mentioning that no one
expected that the United Nations would take the role of transitional administrator
in East Timor and Kosovo); see also de Mello, supra note 64, at 6 (noting that "[i]t
is unlikely that the United Nations will be asked again in the near future to assume
such broad Governance mandates").
246. See de Mello, supra note 64, at 6 (stating that recent history teaches us
"that what is unlikely usually happens").
247. Thakur, supra note 21, at 119.
248. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1178 (predicting that there is good reason
to expect the United Nations' involvement to intensify due to the historical
evolution of peace operations).
249. Thakur, supra note 21, at 122; see Brahimi Report, supra note 1, para. 81
(arguing that a common justice package would have been easier to apply); see also
CHOPRA, supra note 50, at 16 (stating that criminal law should be a "simplified
document"), Plunkett, supra note 67, at 69 (observing that "where no law exists, a
UN 'off the shelf criminal law and procedure is essential in any peace
maintenance arsenal"); Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1156 (noting that an interim
criminal law created by the United Nations would be potentially useful).
250. See Thakur, supra note 21, at 122 (noting that judges, prosecutors, and
investigators cannot aid civil authority where no legal framework exists).
251. See Plunkett, supra note 67, at 69.
252. See Beauvais, supra note 16, at 1157 (citing an interview with Hansj6rg
Strohmeyer).
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integrating human rights law with domestic criminal law.253 It is
likely that the prior experiences of U.N. missions are the most
instructive sources on the need for a model code and the degree to
which it should be drafted.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
A. OTHER MISSIONS
Just as East Timor was not the first example of a complex
peacekeeping operation, it was also not the first time when observers
recognized the need for a generic criminal code.254 In the aftermath
of the Cambodian experience, some note that a body of criminal
procedure and law derived from universal principles is a necessary
item for inclusion in U.N. "justice packages." '255 In that mission, the
application of Vietnamese-drawn criminal law and procedure proved
"woefully unworkable to achieve the U.N.'s fundamental
objectives." '256 As a result, the U.N. Transitional Authority in
Cambodia sought to devise its own code, an activity that proved time
consuming and resulted in an incomplete set of laws.257
The mission in Somalia utilized the former Italian penal code,25
however, in the case of Kosovo, the public bristled at the application
of the penal code and criminal code of procedure of the former
Yugoslavia.259 While the Transitional Administrator responded
accordingly and set in place the application of the Kosovar laws that
preceded Yugoslavian authority, these laws were no more aligned
253. See CHOPRA, supra note 50, at 16.
254. See Plunkett, supra note 67, at 67.
255. See id. (quoting GARETH EVANS, COOPERATING FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL
AGENDA FOR THE 1990'S AND BEYOND 56 (1993)).
256. Id. at 69.
257. See id. (noting that the code failed to enumerate and define legal defenses).
It also drafted the offense of rape without including the requirement of a lack of
consent. Id.
258. See id. (citing the Italian penal code as the legal basis for the criminal
justice system in Somalia).
259. See Strohmeyer, supra note 98, at 112 (noting that this response was likely
due to the fact that Yugoslavia's laws fueled discrimination policies and repressed
the Kosovor Albanian people for a decade).
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with international standards than those of Yugoslavia.260 Because the
first regulation issued by the United Nations Interim Administration
in Kosovo ("UNMIK"), also entitled Regulation 1999/1, is virtually
identical to UNTAET's first regulation, it is reasonable and accurate
to infer that the UNMIK endured difficulties similar to those
experienced by UNTAET.261
B. EAST TIMOR
The difficulties that surfaced in the application of the Indonesian
Code vis-6-vis Regulation 1999/1 varied in scope and effect. While
each arguably serves to affirm the need for a model criminal code,
certain examples specifically highlight the requirement that a model
code needs more substance than a mere "bare-bones" version.
While domestic violence would almost certainly fall outside the
scope of a criminal code that is limited to "serious violations," East
Timor is representative of the fact that post-conflict situations are
ripe for such activity.262 It would be difficult to defend the absence of
domestic violence provisions in a model code for transitional
governance as domestic violence emerged as the dominant crime in
East Timor, comprising nearly half of all criminal offenses in the
post-conflict state. 263 This fact is entirely on point with the findings
of Rehn and Sirleaf, the two independent experts working pursuant
to a Security Council Resolution on Women and Peace and
Security.264 In fact, the East Timorese experience speaks in the same
voice as the experts' Executive Summary: "[d]omestic violence
[needs] to be recognized as systemic and widespread in conflict and
post-conflict situations and addressed in ... legal and security
responses and training in ... post-conflict reconstruction. 265
260. See id. (noting protest among politicians and the legal community).
261. See id. at 59 (describing the similar experiences of UNMIK and UNTAET).
262. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
263. See O'Kane, supra note 152 (stating that domestic violence is the most
prevalent crime in East Timor, making up forty percent of the total offenses).
264. See REHN & SIRLEAF, supra note 151, at 17 (describing the "woefully
inadequate" provisions for female victims of violence).
265. Id. at 18.
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The applicable code in East Timor under the U.N. Transitional
Administration also reinforces the need to include suitable rape
provisions in a model code for transitional governance. A review of
the Indonesian statute establishes the fact that a transitional
administration may not be able to rely on an existing code to address
this issue.266 Though a cultural argument may exist for limitations
placed upon the offence, such as its non-existence within the
confines of marriage, the experience in East Timor creates a strong
argument for the fact that such a restriction has no place in the justice
system of a post-conflict state. The existence of forced marriages in
East Timor illustrates that this type of restriction served to place yet
another tool in the hands of the oppressor.267 In addition, the very
limited definition of the crime left some female victims, and all male
victims, unprotected and without recourse.
The activity of the CNRT in post-conflict East Timor is arguably
representative of what one can expect to find in other post-conflict
situations.26 Namely, it is reasonable to anticipate, particularly in
cases of internal division, that a prevailing faction may seek to
extract revenge upon its former opposition. Thus, there exists a
strong argument for an expansive definition of torture in a model
code for transitional governance. 69 In light of the fact that the model
code may achieve domestic compliance with present customary
international law by limiting the application of the crime to instances
involving official conduct, a broader definition needs to be included
in the model code.27°
As with regard to domestic violence, the case of Takeshi
Kashiwagi argues against the creation of a narrowly drawn model
266. See supra notes 158-169 and accompanying text.
267. See Charlesworth & Wood, supra note 22, at 315.
268. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 148, §l(c) (noting that the CNRT
security groups were involved in instances of torture and other forms of cruel and
inhuman punishment).
269. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (noting UNTAET's decision to
ultimately apply an expansive definition of torture that would include the activity
of private citizens).
270. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (citing language used in the
Convention Against Torture).
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code. 27 1 Not only would defamation provisions fall outside the
purview of "serious crimes," acts of libel, slander and the like would
likely rather be civil in nature. The danger in drafting an incomplete
model criminal code is the resultant likelihood that former legal
provisions would come into play to fill the void left by a narrowly
drafted code. In the case of a state wherein speech has been severely
curtailed in order to assure political dominance, the danger of history
repeating itself is clear.2 72 The case of Takeshi Kashiwagi is one
wherein the oppressed became the oppressor, with the newly found
state using its former persecutor's tool as its own, and all under the
auspices of U.N. authority.273 To fail to address the potential for this
danger by providing a complete model code would likely subject the
United Nations to criticism, result in instances of unjust
imprisonment, and hinder the growth of the nascent state in both the
context of politics and human rights.
Had a complete model code existed prior to UNTAET, authorities
would have circumvented the difficulties experienced in both
accessing and translating the applicable code. 274 Further, both
CIVPOL and U.N. legal experts would have been familiar with, and
trained in, the applicable law prior to its application.275 The existence
of a code would have been helpful in procuring legal assistance from
non-governmental organizations that, in a like manner, could have
had the earlier training necessary to assist in the establishment of the
East Timorese justice system. 276 Such a code would also have
ensured that the applicable punishments were commensurate to the
271. See supra Part 1Il.C.4 (describing the Kashiwagi case).
272. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (noting that historically, the
crime of defamation existed as a tool to silence political opposition and criticism).
273. See supra notes 198-202 (describing the circumstances surrounding
Kashiwagi's arrest).
274. See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties
inherent in acting without a clear code that is consistent with international human
rights standards).
275. See Linton, supra note 17, at 137 (noting that the officials' lack of
instruction and experience with legal provisions can have dangerous results, as
exemplified by the Kashiwagi case).
276. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (stating that non-governmental
organizations were not able to receive legal training reserved for governmental
employees).
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relevant crime and would have enabled the transitional
administration to have an alternative focus for the energies it
expended on a code that provided for the criminalization of
attempted defamation but not attempted assault. An interim code
would also have created a "clean slate" that would have brought with
it an increased likelihood of respect for the rule of law. It would also
have guaranteed textual compliance with international standards,
making the transitional administration less vulnerable to civil
liability, as in the case of Takeshi Kashiwagi.2" As was
acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "it is
essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law." '278 A model code would
establish such protections.27 9 In sum, a complete model criminal code
for transitional governance would have assisted the transitional
administration in East Timor on many fronts and could thus,
analogously, serve to prevent similar problems from surfacing under
future administrations.
277. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (describing the basis of
Kashiwagi's civil suit).
278. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 195, pmbl.
279. See CHOPRA, supra note 50, at 16 (stating that "special account should be
taken of the unique dimensions of human rights law").
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